A Primer of Middle Eastern Leadership Culture by Greaves, Sheldon
Journal of Strategic
Security
Volume 5
Number 4 Volume 5, No. 4: Winter
2012
Article 12
A Primer of Middle Eastern
Leadership Culture
Sheldon Greaves
Henley-Putnam University, drshel02816@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss
pp. 99-118
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Recommended Citation
Greaves, Sheldon. "A Primer of Middle Eastern Leadership Culture."
Journal of Strategic Security 5, no. 4 (2012) : 99-118.
DOI:
http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.4.7
Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss4/12
A Primer of Middle Eastern Leadership Culture
Author Biography
Dr. Sheldon Greaves is an independent scholar and part-time faculty
member at Henley-Putnam University, where he teaches courses in
religious extremism and covert organizations. He is a founder of Henley-
Putnam University, and the Founder of the Journal of Strategic Security.
He holds a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Studies from the University of
California at Berkeley and lives in San Jose, CA.
Abstract
It is natural for someone looking in on a foreign culture from the outside
to interpret what they see and frame their reactions based on their own
background and assumptions. With cultures as a different as those of the
Middle East and the West, the potential for blunders increases
dramatically, made worse by the high political, diplomatic, military, and
commercial stakes involved. Leadership culture in this region has been
shaped over centuries through a variety of factors, such as reputation,
family, and religion, which continue to influence decision making. The
present study posits that an understanding of these factors and how they
work is crucial for intelligence analysts, policy and decision makers,
strategists, and scholars who must find their way through a very
unfamiliar cultural landscape in the Middle East. It is hoped that this
discussion will in some way assist in the creation of more effective
interaction, policies, and analysis associated with the Middle East.
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security:
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss4/12
Journal of Strategic Security
Volume 5 Issue 4 2012, pp. 99-118
DOI: 10.5038/1944-0472.5.4.7
Journal of Strategic Security
(c) 2012 ISSN: 1944-0464 eISSN: 1944-0472 99
A Primer of Middle Eastern 
Leadership Culture
Sheldon Greaves
Henley-Putnam University
Introduction
Many factors determine the needs of national leadership, not all of which 
are always apparent to an outside observer. In the case of the national and 
regional leadership in the Middle East, history, culture, religion, and 
geography form a unique complex that influence both the decisions made 
by leaders and how others view those decisions. This primer examines a 
number of these factors and explores their influence on many of the lead-
ers of Middle Eastern government and other major organizations. For 
purposes of this primer, "Middle Eastern" government excludes the gov-
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Middle East and the West, the potential for blunders increases dramati-
cally, made worse by the high political, diplomatic, military, and commer-
cial stakes involved. Leadership culture in this region has been shaped 
over centuries through a variety of factors, such as reputation, family, and 
religion, which continue to influence decision making. The present study 
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ernment of Israel, which is clearly shaped by a European model and was 
in fact created by European Jewish immigrants. The warning issued by 
Richards J. Heuer in 1999 is just as relevant today:
"To see the options faced by foreign leaders as these leaders see 
them, one must understand their values and assumptions and 
even their misperceptions and misunderstandings. Without such 
insight, interpreting foreign leaders' decisions of forecasting 
future decisions is often little more than partially informed specu-
lation. Too frequently, foreign behavior appears 'irrational' or 
'Not in their best interest.' Such conclusions often indicate ana-
lysts have projected American values and conceptual frameworks 
onto the foreign leaders and societies, rather than understanding 
the logic of the situation as it appears to them."1
Defining "Leadership Culture"
Leadership culture is that body of cultural understandings by which lead-
ers and citizens develop the necessary trust to govern effectively. This cul-
tural understanding also influences the expectations of behavior and 
attitudes on both ends of the leadership spectrum. To further explain this 
process, the American experience provides a useful exposition. Americans 
place a premium on certain qualities in their leaders that are not all that 
different from those of any other region: fairness, decisiveness, hard 
work, service in the military, an interesting life history that includes over-
coming various obstacles. But for Americans, these traits become more 
potent if the leader can link them to the historical and cultural roots of the 
American national character, namely, the frontier with its westward 
expansion, carving civilization out of a trackless wilderness through grit, 
ingenuity, and determination. Prior to that, we have the values of the 
Founding Fathers who put their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred 
honor on the line against an oppressive monarch backed by the greatest 
military power since Rome—and won. They, in turn succeeded the pious 
pilgrim forefathers, religious refugees seeking escape from persecution in 
a wild, still mostly undiscovered country. Gilbert Fairholm admirably 
summarized the role of culture in leadership thusly:
"Leadership is not so much a function of the individual leader as 
it is a function of culture. While leadership may be spontaneous 
at times, most often it is the result of specific, planned actions by 
individual leaders to create organizational cultures characterized 
by internal harmony around values and ideas the leader and fol-
lower share or come to share."2
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Even a casual observer of a presidential election will find numerous 
attempts to at least pay passing homage to the colonist, the soldier, the 
pilgrim, the citizen legislator, the cowboy, the farmer not only as they are 
today, but as ideals. By evoking these images, leaders build credibility, 
associating themselves with historical and cultural archetypes. However, 
an astute observer will also note that the United States is by no means a 
monolithic country. Particularly in more recent decades, the national 
character has become more fragmented, regionalism more pronounced.3 
In a way, this is more instructive as one observes how national candidates 
cater to regional cultures in subtle and not-so-subtle ways.
Out of the Desert
For the leadership cultures of the Middle East, culture has three major 
formative areas: the city, the village, and the desert.4 Of these three, the 
latter has by far the most profound influence on those traits that evoke 
admiration and loyalty among Mideast populations. While much of this is 
due, no doubt, to the modern tendency to idolize a way of life that per-
sisted against such a harsh background for thousands of years, it is also 
clearly because of another major factor that formed in the context of the 
desert: Islam. That said, the Prophet Mohammed was himself well 
acquainted with city life, but it was his persona as a desert tribal and reli-
gious figure that helped define the dominant cultural substratum of the 
Middle East.
One sees even today how often Mideast leaders employ the garb of the 
desert nomads as part of their official dress. The Saudi royal family is, of 
course, well known for this, as are other leaders such as the late Muamar 
Qaddafi. Even when wearing western style military uniforms, officers and 
state officials often retain a traditional desert or village headdress.
The values of the desert, as exemplified by the Bedouin nomad, seem at 
first glance to be at odds with the requirements of leadership. The Bedu 
exist historically in a circumstance practically devoid of political power as 
westerners understand it. There was no overarching system of laws or 
means to compel any one man to do anything he didn't want to do. State 
sanctions against crime were unknown and, when tried, generally failed 
to impress the Bedouin tribesmen whose fierce independence was the 
stuff of legend. At the same time, Bedouins were as egalitarian as they 
were autonomous.
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Key Cultural Values in the Middle East
Reputation
Ironically, it was this very lack of a larger ruling structure that led to the 
development of reputation as a key cultural value in ancient, medieval, 
and early modern Bedouin societies. There are three types of reputations 
relevant to leadership cultural values in the Middle East: political, eco-
nomic, and knowledge or information-based reputation. Reputation car-
ries far greater weight, both as political power and as wealth, in the 
Middle East than it does in Western societies. Politically, reputation was 
directly equivalent to political power:
"In a system where every man is equally free to follow his own 
bent and where there is no mechanism for coercion, the only 
political power available is the ability to influence the decision of 
others. This rests on four factors: good information, the ability to 
give good advice, a reputation for sound counsel, and an audience 
to influence. All must be acquired."5
Economic reputation is not merely a means to acquire material wealth 
among the Bedouin, it is wealth; it is currency in the Bedu society. This 
cultural view of reputation flows from the reality of life in the desert 
among a nomadic people where wealth must be "highly mobile, easily pre-
servable, and non-stealable, in other words, non-material, like reputa-
tion."6 Knowledge that a person possesses is critical to one's reputation 
for expertise and offering good advice. As such, it must be preserved like 
the currency that it is. This creates disincentives about being too free with 
one's knowledge. So long as you know something important that no one 
else knows, the thinking goes, you are indispensable. While this helped to 
preserve the value of one's reputation in the desert, in modern life where 
the free flow of information is critical to success, this attitude creates 
problems in the Middle East even today.
Norvell B. De Atkine points out in his study of the lack of effectiveness in 
Arab military formations that the attitude of information and knowledge 
as personal currency vital to an individual's reputation and, by extension, 
rank can create bottlenecks during critical events.7 For example, soldiers 
may not be fully trained in a particular weapon system because the officer 
in charge who had that information withheld it in order to preserve his 
position. The result is poor performance on the part of the soldiers with 
negative results on the battlefield. De Atkine illustrates this point with the 
following anecdote:
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"On one occasion, an American mobile training team working 
with armor in Egypt at long last received the operators' manuals 
that had laboriously been translated into Arabic. The American 
trainers took the newly minted manuals straight to the tank park 
and distributed them to the tank crews. Right behind them, the 
company commander, a graduate of the armor school at Fort 
Knox and specialized courses at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds 
ordnance school, promptly collected the manuals from those 
crews. Questioned why he did this, the commander said that 
there was no point in giving them to the drivers because enlisted 
men could not read. In point of fact, he did not want enlisted men 
to have an independent source of knowledge. Being the only per-
son who could explain the fire control instrumentation or bore 
sight artillery weapons brought prestige and attention."8
Wealth
The Bedouin family economy was historically based on camels. They pro-
vided food in the form of milk, fuel, and transportation. They were not, 
however, synonymous with wealth. A moment's consideration will show 
why this is so. Fifteen to twenty camels was enough to support a family of 
about six persons. If you have extra camels and if you were near a town, 
you could sell them for gold, but it would not be of any use in the desert. 
Gold is heavy. You can't burn it to cook over it, you can't drink it when 
you're thirsty, or eat it when you're hungry. It invites theft or, perhaps 
worse, people asking for loans. You could convert the gold into something 
else, such as fine clothing, which will look very ordinary after a few weeks 
of hard wear in the desert. One could buy expensive weaponry, but that 
invites theft and raiding without much improvement in effectiveness.
Camels could also be converted directly into food. However, butchering 
an extra camel as food is a highly unprofitable use of the animal; they are 
large animals with far more meat than an average family could possibly 
consume before the meat spoiled. Finally, consider that if you decided to 
expand your herds, you would eventually need herdsmen. Raiding was a 
popular activity, so you would need to hire guards in addition to the 
herdsmen. How would you pay them? All you have are excess camels, but 
once each employee has enough camels, they no longer need to work for 
you and can become independent, leaving you back where you started. In 
other words, treating camels as wealth just wasn't viable.9
On the other hand, reputation could be garnered through disposing of 
excess camels by giving them away in a show of generosity. One can also 
gain reputation by acquiring camels through raiding—the greater the 
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audacity and cunning, the better. But then those extra camels can also be 
given away. In other words, you gain reputation based not on how much 
material wealth you acquire, but on how much passes through your 
hands.10 While giving away camels enhances reputation, losing your cam-
els because a clever raider made off with them does not. This ideal per-
sists in popular culture throughout the Middle East to this day. It helps to 
explain the role of favors granted by a leader to cronies and allies. By 
showing generosity, he enhances his own reputation.
Raiding
In the case of camels as a source of resources such as milk, etc., raiding for 
camels has traditionally been the way of obtaining them, since the fertility 
rate among pastoral camels has never been high enough to provide 
enough animals for all.11 In addition, the occasional drought can wipe out 
large fractions of a herd, or even entire herds. Thus, raiding has been a 
way of life for the Bedu for centuries. In fact, it is fair to say that raiding 
was the driver of economic change in the desert. Along with diplomatic 
and negotiating skills and generosity, raiding—and the qualities that 
make a successful raider—is a primary source of reputation. Someone 
who can both defend their own holdings while successfully taking 
resources through daring, cunning, courage, and audacity is admired and 
could well be marked for leadership, provided they survive long enough.12
Hospitality
The role of generosity as a means to reputation leads us neatly into the 
role of hospitality in Mideast culture. The desert peoples are famous for 
their justly deserved reputations as hospitable hosts. The institutions of 
hospitality toward the stranger in your tent stretches back to time imme-
morial and once formed the basis of trade, commerce, and sometimes 
one's very survival. In addition to its value as a pious act and a means to 
acquire reputation, extending hospitality to a stranger was historically a 
means to develop trade and business arrangements. If the stranger was 
related to some degree, it might result in a marriage. In any case, this 
matter is still taken very seriously by Mideast peoples. An article written 
by Omar Tsalich El-Barghuthiin 1924 on Arab rules of hospitality in Pal-
estine describes the great lengths villagers would go to in order to have 
the privilege of entertaining a passing traveler.13 Depending on the cir-
cumstances, proper displays of hospitality, especially for important visi-
tors, required considerable effort and resources. The account of a Bedouin 
feast recounted by T. E. Lawrence remains an excellent example of such a 
gathering.14
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The bond of obligation between guest and host is deeply respected even 
today. Traditionally the host is responsible for seeing to the needs of the 
guest, up to and including protecting the guest from harm, even if it 
meant putting himself or members of his family in harm's way. The guest 
also had obligations, but they tend to pale in comparison with those of the 
host. Further, the guest could invoke the laws of hospitality even from 
someone who was a sworn enemy and rest safely in that person's tent 
until the next day when they took their leave.
In a more modern example, shortly after the September 11 attacks, the 
United States demanded that the Taliban leaders in Afghanistan hand 
over Usama bin Ladin to western authorities. The Taliban replied that 
they could not do so because bin Ladin was a "guest."15 Most westerners 
saw this as a cynical ploy to protect a fellow Muslim, and it clearly was at 
some level. But anyone familiar with the ancient laws of hospitality would 
have recognized this as a deeply legitimate response within the context of 
the culture. The Taliban could not have given up their guest, no matter 
how great a liability he had become, without a significant loss of reputa-
tion and political stature among their own people.
Gifts
In a culture where money is not always available for use as a medium of 
exchange, barter was common. However, the giving of gifts in desert and 
other early Mideast cultures included a layer of complexity extending 
beyond the needs of mundane commerce. Gifts and gift-giving formed yet 
another way to establish reputation, as described above, and a way to 
establish relationships or even place underlings under obligation.
Gift culture in the eastern Mediterranean basin has very deep roots. The 
use of gifts as a tool of statecraft are attested as far back as the mid-third 
millennium BCE in the ancient Egyptian text "Teachings of Ptah-hotep," 
which instructs the reader that positions of authority demand generos-
ity.16 This and other such texts from throughout the region treat gift giv-
ing from a position of power as a charitable or civic duty; however, there 
is also obligatory gift giving which follows a more rigid protocol, and can 
be manipulated by either party for political advantage. In one study that 
discusses these ancient protocols for the general region, Victor H. Mat-
thews isolates four elements that continue to inform this practice in vary-
ing degrees up to the present time:
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1. Gifts must be given by a patron for every service rendered by a client.
2. All gifts must be equally measured so that there is no advantage to be 
gained by either side of the exchange.
3. Failure to give an appropriate gift dishonors the donor and insults the 
recipient.
4. The recipient may not contest the gift offered, but demur, based on the 
donor of the household, may be employed either to refuse the gift or 
negotiate a change in the gift.17
The exchange of gifts is a means to establish relationships, but the value 
of the gift is important. Reciprocation is expected. This means that gifts of 
roughly equal value will be exchanged, which also means that most gift 
exchanges take place between members of the same general economic 
stratum. However, there are some instances where a richer or more pow-
erful person will give a gift that is beyond the ability of the receiver to 
reciprocate. In such cases, assuming they accept the gift, it places the 
receiver under an obligation until such time, if any, that they can repay.
Gifts could also convey messages not overtly expressed, but clearly under-
stood nevertheless. For example, a "gift" of offering protection of one tribe 
by another, if accepted, amounted to an admission of their inability to 
defend themselves and, additionally, acknowledgment of their status as a 
vassal tribe vis-á-vis the stronger tribe.
Family
Observers of Mideast politics will note that the family of a ruler is deeply 
integrated into that ruler's administration. This is one of the more persis-
tent remnants of the Bedouin culture, the almost exclusive priority given 
to members of the family or tribe in matters of access, resources, and 
power. The acquisition of personal power allows one to augment that 
power and reputation within the "reputation range" of one's family and 
tribe. This is one reason why the concept of democracy as the basis for a 
political nation-state has had so little traction in the Middle East.18
The ecology of the desert enforces an uncompromising standard for sur-
vival. Those who managed to overcome the difficulties of life in the desert 
do so at the expense of those who cannot. The ability to maintain and 
increase herds and to defend graze lands and watering holes, all play a 
role in creating a viable family group. Because resources are so scarce, a 
family or tribe must see to its own needs first and, if necessary, take the 
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needed resources from those who cannot hold on to them. For similar rea-
sons, the idea of sharing with other "outside" people beyond small-scale 
situations such as hospitality to a guest or individual supplicant on reli-
gious grounds simply isn't part of the Bedouin mentality.
Women, especially those who bear children, are seen as a significant 
source of power inasmuch as they produce plenty of males needed to 
defend a tribe's interests. This is one reason why endogamy is permitted 
among the Bedu; allowing a woman to go to another tribe makes no sense 
in this context, and only happens if there are significant overriding con-
siderations, such as forming alliances. For this reason, they tend to be 
"hoarded" as a source of potential power, and not given away or bartered 
as with other forms of material goods.
In spite of the life-or-death stakes in raiding, certain conventions pre-
vailed that gave the activity an almost sporting aspect. For example, it was 
considered bad form to take all of the camels or other herd animals from a 
victim. Women and other non-combatants were not hurt, even if they 
counterattacked. Moreover, for reasons given, a successful raider still 
must dispose of excess (and therefore useless) booty in a way that will 
enhance his reputation. This can have interesting outcomes as in this 
account:
"The Rwala are ever at war with one tribe of another. Without war 
a Rweijli could not live. War gives him an opportunity of [sic] dis-
play his cunning, endurance, and courage… The booty itself he 
will give away without thinking much about it—even to the wife of 
the very man he has just robbed."19
Because human populations grow, and the desert environment imposes a 
hard limit to the number of persons who can live there, rivalries and hard 
luck take their toll. Those who do not manage are "sloughed off" from the 
rest of the tribe, making their way to the periphery of the desert or more 
commonly, into towns and villages. This has two important effects. First, 
it explains the flow of Bedouin cultural values and norms into villages and 
other settled populations of the Middle East.20 Once these former 
nomads find themselves in their new environment, they must essentially 
start over in an effort to make a place for themselves in a social context 
informed by the rules they once knew, but with differences and new eco-
nomic pressures.
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Dealing with Rivals
The recommended course of action for dealing with rivals in the Middle 
East has generally been to act swiftly, decisively, and ruthlessly. The 
Bedu, in spite of traditions of blood vengeance and feuding, devised a 
number of conventions to keep such conflicts from spilling over. One rea-
son for this is that if one member of a tribe kills someone from another 
tribe, it can embroil members of both tribes who would rather not be 
bothered with such things. In fact, the Rwala Bedouin went to such 
lengths to avoid bloodshed for this and other reasons that they developed 
a reputation for cowardice.21
The history of violence of the Bedouin forms the larger pattern of 
destroying one's enemies and rivals as a matter of both state policy and 
personal vendetta in Mideast culture. The ultimate solution to the 
problem of political rivals goes back to the dimmest antiquity; in an 
otherwise enlightened list of advice to his son and heir to the throne, 
Meri-Ka-Re's father gave him the following advice on dealing with a rival: 
"…remove him, kill [him], wipe out his name, [destroy] his faction, banish 
the memory of him and of his adherents who love him."22 But removing a 
rival involved more than merely killing him. There was the need to add an 
extra show of utter domination of and contempt for the fallen foe. 
Dispatching a highly visible and once-powerful enemy had to include a 
clear and unmistakable message for any who might try to succeed where 
he had failed. Rulers understood that if they added a dash of atrocity to 
their triumph, word would get around faster and have the desired effect to 
burnish their reputation.
Numerous examples of eliminating political rivals comprise some of the 
more colorful bits of Middle Eastern history. There was the Ottoman Sul-
tan Murad I who, when his hated son Cuntuz tried to overthrow him one 
too many times, personally tore out his son's eyes before handing him 
over to a headsman. Moreover, he insisted that the fathers of all the other 
co-conspirators do likewise. All but two complied; they died alongside 
their sons. Another famous sultan, Bayazid II was taken alive after his 
disastrous campaign against Tamerlane, who himself was famous for 
leaving pyramids of severed heads beside the cities he conquered. After he 
was captured following the fateful battle of Ankara, Bayazid was taken 
back to Samarkand caged like a beast, where he served as Tamerlane's 
footstool. His favorite concubine was forced to serve her new master 
naked. Bayazid died shortly thereafter, probably by his own hand. Yet 
another example is the death in 750 C.E. of the last Caliph of the Umayyad 
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Dynasty who was tracked by his Abbasid foes to a small church in Egypt's 
Nile delta. After decapitating the Caliph, his tongue was cut out and fed to 
a cat.23
Even with the presumed gentling effects of modern statecraft and western 
influence, this attitude toward rivals persists in the Middle East. The kill-
ing or imprisonment and torture of political rivals by the repressive 
regimes of Saddam Hussein, Hafez al-Assad, Muamar Qaddafi, and Hosni 
Mubarak among others are already well documented. One need only 
recall the fate of the neighborhood of Hama in 1982, then a hotbed of dis-
sent by the Muslim Brotherhood. Syrian President Hafez al-Assad cor-
doned off the area, allowing none to leave. The Syrian army bombarded 
Hama with an extended artillery barrage. Remaining buildings were 
pumped full of cyanide gas, razed to the ground, the rubble steamrolled 
into gravel, and a new housing development built on the site. Ghengis 
Khan could hardly have done better. The message was received; the Mus-
lim Brotherhood was virtually unknown in Syria for decades afterwards. 
It is ironic that in the current uprising against Bashar al-Assad, the site of 
Hama is once again a center of anti-government resistance.24
Religion
Religion informs politics in the Middle East to a degree difficult to imag-
ine in Western societies. Clearly, much of the reason for this is because, as 
Bernard Lewis once put it, Islam's Christ was also its Constantine.25 It is 
natural to assume that the values of the desert nomads and Islam mesh 
together to create a consistent cultural substratum for Middle Eastern 
leadership culture. Such an assumption would be incorrect.
Although Westerners tend to equate the Bedu with Islam, a closer look at 
the respective cultures makes it clear that the Prophet's vision was very 
much at odds with the prevailing culture. In fact, Bedu culture embodies 
both Muslim and pre-Islamic jahiliyyah values.26 To take one example, 
Muhammed explicitly rejected the tribal jahiliyyahasabiyyah of favoring 
one's own kin over all others. Islam emphasized equality and justice 
among all peoples as one Hadith put it, just like the teeth of the comb are 
equal.27 While this was welcomed on one level by the Bedouin, for whom 
equality and egalitarianism defines their normal interactions, extending 
this to granting political power to non-tribal members did not catch on as 
readily. That said, other desert values of generosity, protecting the weak, 
simplicity, and rule by consultation with others were accepted.
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The reigns of the first four Caliphs (Khulafa Rashidoun or Rightly Guided 
Successors) embraced these values strongly. Each new Caliph was 
selected by the consensus of a shura or council. The Caliph was accessible 
to all, and anyone could see the Caliph directly. The Caliphs had a reputa-
tion for listening carefully to all when making a decision, ensuring that all 
viewpoints informed the discussion, and having the good grace to admit 
error.28
All this changed when the last of the Rightly Guided Caliphs died in 661 
CE. The Caliphate was taken over by the Umayyad tribe, which ironically 
had been one of Muhammed's staunchest opponents. The new Caliph, 
Muawiya, abandoned both letter and spirit of Muslim governance by plac-
ing numerous bureaucratic barriers between the Caliph and his subjects. 
The shura, while still used, became little more than a rubber stamp 
dressed in rituals of sycophantic flattery. When Muawiya declared his son 
Yazid to be next in line for the Caliphate, it marked the return of favoring 
of one's own kin. This was not lost on the umma, the community of believ-
ers, but Yazid proved to be adept at crushing those who objected, even 
ordering the murder of the Prophet's grandson Hussein at Kerbala.
As Islam continued to expand into lands and cultures beyond the culture 
of Arabia, Muslims struggled to balance the old traditions of favoritism, 
first of kin, and eventually that of Arabs over other ethnic groups, even 
though the Quran and Hadith are clearly against such favoritism. Gradu-
ally, the original vision of Islam more or less won out and, in those times 
and places where a semblance of ethnic and cultural diversity took hold, 
the Muslim world became one of the most vibrant, innovative, and 
dynamic civilizations of this or any age.
Shar'ia Law
A major contribution of Islam to the leadership culture of the Middle East 
is, naturally, its legal codes of shar'ia. The word means "path" but more 
specifically, a path that leads to water. For desert dwellers, the implica-
tion was a path to salvation. But the popular (and grossly inaccurate) pic-
ture of shar'ia law as a harsh, brutal, and primitive legal code bears almost 
no resemblance to its roots. Shar'ia grew out of the teachings of the 
Quran, which gave only general guidelines for dealing with crime and 
punishment. Most infractions were addressed by consultation, persua-
sion, and inviting the miscreant to repent. Punishments are almost com-
pletely lacking; in all the Quran there are only four mandated criminal 
punishments. Shar'ia evolved four separate schools of jurisprudence, plus 
a separate Shi'ite school, each emphasizing different methodologies for 
evaluating cases and developing legal theory.
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Historically, there has been a significant disconnect between the punish-
ments mandated by the Quran and the Hadith, and what was actually 
handed down by religious courts. Jurists and judges typically went to 
great, even absurd lengths to actually avoid employing harsher penalties 
even for "crimes against God" (hadd) offenses found in the Quran. Mus-
lim populations, contrary to how they are portrayed in the West, consis-
tently demonstrate distaste for brutal, corporal punishments for religious 
crimes. Pakistan attempted in the late 1970's to officially "revive" a more 
punitive "traditional" form of Islamic criminal law. In fact, such brutal 
punishments, and especially carrying out such sentences in large public 
spectacles was seldom if ever practiced historically. While large crowds 
gathered for the open-air whippings and executions at first, the public 
soon grew disenchanted and executions were being canceled for want of 
an audience. In the face of quiet but resolute public disapproval, these 
public judicial punishments formally vanished from Pakistan in 1979, and 
have not returned.29
Since the end of the Ottoman Caliphate in the early 20th Century, the 
administration and development of shar'ia law has proven to be problem-
atic. Not only was there no Caliph or "Shadow of God" to administer and 
oversee such matters, but secular leaders of Muslim nations have stead-
fastly refused to step into the vacuum left by the loss of the Caliphate. Per-
haps the most significant example was the invasion of Afghanistan by the 
Soviets in 1979. For various political reasons, most of them variations on 
the theme of self-preservation, the surrounding nations refused to declare 
jihad in defense of their Muslim brothers and sisters facing Soviet aggres-
sion.30 This led others to step into the vacuum and take upon themselves 
the task of issuing fatwas and calls for jihad. When these calls led to thou-
sands of Muslims going to Afghanistan, it created an entirely new wild-
card factor that has led to a form of shar'ia completely different from its 
form only a century before. Perhaps the most significant aspect of this is 
the concept of takfir, or the right of one Muslim to declare another Mus-
lim to be an infidel based on differences in belief of practice and, hence, 
worthy of death. Once an obscure idea meant to allow a Muslim army to 
fight another army that included Muslims on a battlefield, this idea is one 
of the key enabling concepts used to justify violence by Islamist radicals 
against fellow Muslims.
Islam has added another cultural factor to daily attitudes that most West-
erners find difficult to grasp, and that is the belief in the total omnipo-
tence of Allah. In other words, Muslim theology tends to view everything, 
even the smallest or most insignificant act as being under the complete, 
deliberate control of God and, if something goes a certain way, it is the 
will of Allah. To Western eyes, this appears as a kind of fatalism, a surren-
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der to forces too large and too powerful to control. However, this charac-
terization is insufficient. More accurately, it is a nod to the general 
uncertainty of life and a mental paradigm that allows one, in spite of one's 
best efforts, to face misfortune with equanimity. That said, there are 
believers who point to Allah's omnipotence as a reason to not prepare or 
train for certain events; if Allah wishes, all will turn out well. If not, no 
amount of preparation will suffice.
Muhammed the Archetype of Middle 
East Leadership
Given the towering stature of Islam's founder it is easy to understand why 
he is a model for emulation by others in positions of leadership. The 
extensive hagiography surrounding the life and character of the Prophet 
uniformly portrays a certain behavioral and moral standard that non-
Muslims will find unsatisfying. But those values are still of interest since, 
even if they are not strictly historical according to Western standards, 
they do reflect the expectations that grew out of the life and ministry of 
the Prophet; however, much that legacy has been idealized by his follow-
ers. Given the strength of those traditions, there is little reason to doubt 
that there is at least a kernel of truth behind these traditions.
When one places the values ascribed to Muhammed alongside those of his 
less pious but politically successful successors, one encounters the same 
friction that one finds between the open, egalitarian access to the Caliph 
versus the more bureaucratic approach taken by the Umayyads. The 
Quran is quite clear that the Prophet much preferred to work through per-
suasion, moral example, and goodwill. He is uniformly depicted as kind, 
generous, humble, godly, and charitable, traits that can apply to very few 
of those who succeeded him to the Caliphate. For modern Mideast leaders 
bound by the demands realpolitik, this can translate into a delicate bal-
ancing act that cannot help but draw accusations of hypocrisy or worse if 
their attempts to mimic the character of the Prophet are too far removed 
from their political actions.
National Leadership Cultures: Egypt vs. Libya 
in the Arab Spring
A comparison of the actions taken by the Egyptian and Libyan govern-
ments faced by the Arab Spring upheavals illustrates the impact of 
national leadership cultures in the Middle East. While many other exam-
ples could be cited here, including countries undergoing upheaval in the 
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Levant, Libya and Egypt pose a convenient dichotomy in adaptation of 
different values and cultural norms that influence national leadership 
organization and decision making in their respective governments. Spe-
cifically, the Libyan regime under Qaddafi was focused on personal 
power, where the state apparatus was based on family and cronyism, and 
accumulation of personal power. By contrast, Egypt had a Western-style 
government built to support the national leader's personal power base, 
but whose military was trained more as an agent of the state rather than 
the tool of any one person or junta.
In the case of Qaddafi, many of his top commanders and ministers were 
members of his Ghaddafa tribe, or consisted of others who had various 
ties to him personally.31 Qaddafi also maintained an "Islamic Legion" of 
foreign soldiers who were pledged to Qaddafi personally. The manner of 
how Libya's inner circle was constructed also bore a striking resemblance 
to the use of outside forces by the Abbasid Caliphate as it slid into decline 
before its annihilation by the Mongols. The caliphs made extensive use of 
mercenaries and slave soldiers, or sometimes soldiers who had somehow 
become obligated to the caliph to form private armies that foreshadowed 
the Ottoman Janissaries. Such armies and government structures were 
very much in keeping with the norms examined already; the need to pre-
serve personal power and the power of one's tribe at the expense of oth-
ers. It is also very consistent with the use of overwhelming force to deal 
with rivals, be they pretenders to the throne or angry protesters. For these 
and related reasons, Libyan forces had few qualms about opening fire on 
protesters, sparking the civil war that ended with the death of Qaddafi 
and the destruction of his power base.
Qaddafi insisted that power remain in his hands, a professional military 
under a unified command would be anathema. Leaders like Qaddafi tend 
to build their military forces in layers or concentric circles, with the inner 
layer consisting of well-trained, well-paid, and equipped soldiers who are 
have tribal or other ties to the ruling family. As one extends out from the 
inner circle, the army is less professional, less competent and has lower 
morale. Inner circle units often have grand names such as "Presidential 
Guard" or "Republican Guard" and make up a vital part of a ruler's public 
image. They will also reflect his personal ambitions—or delusions.
The Egyptian army, by contrast is one of the more modern, egalitarian, 
and even progressive components of Egyptian society today. "Inner-
circle" units of the kind found in Libya are unknown. The closest parallel 
to the Libyan model in Egypt are the Central Security Forces, a badly-
trained, poorly equipped paramilitary force composed mostly of 
conscripts. After the end of the Cold War, Egypt shifted its military away 
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from the doctrine it acquired from the Soviets as a political force and took 
on a more Western role in the affairs of state; not so much loyal to any one 
person, but definitely loyal to its own interests, as well as to the continuity 
of a functioning Egyptian government. That said, Egyptian officers are 
graduates of Egypt's very respectable Egyptian Military Academy, and 
they have also received training at top military institutions around the 
world, including in the United States.
The irony is that it took a great deal of effort to convert the military from a 
loose cannon (it was a military coup that overthrew King Farouk in 1952) 
to a more professional, modern army has long been regarded as one of 
President Mubarak's more notable achievements. Not only did the Egyp-
tian army prove unwilling to fire on civilians when so ordered by 
Mubarak, they played "referee" in the ensuing uncertain climate after 
Mubarak stepped down. They continue to play an important, if controver-
sial, role in the direction Egypt will take as it forges a new future.
Conclusion
Many factors impact the culture of leadership in the Middle East and 
influence how decisions are made and how others view those decisions. 
Such factors include the value of reputation, which carries far greater 
weight in the Middle East than it does in Western societies. Wealth is a 
function of one's reputation, and has little to do with material posses-
sions. Hospitality and gift-giving are key tenets of leadership culture, and 
played a role in the Taliban refusing to surrender bin Ladin to the United 
States because he was their "guest." Tribal, clan, and familial ties in the 
Middle East matter a great deal to leadership culture, and this primer 
explored the impact of such values on the military structures of Libya and 
Egypt as brief case studies. Finally, Islam has had a profound influence on 
Middle East culture, imparting new ideas while also absorbing—and bal-
ancing—the traditions of the desert nomads that preceded the Prophet.
This primer concludes with a warning similar to the one that started it; 
namely, that cultural norms provide a context in which leaders choose to 
act. Reputation, tradition, history, and religion play important roles in 
shaping decisions of leaders in the Middle East and the desired percep-
tion. A deeper understanding of the salient elements of Mideast cultural 
enumerated in this primer can do much to inform those tasked with ana-
lyzing and evaluating leadership in this historically volatile region, espe-
cially during one of the most precarious periods in its recent history.
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